Subjective Confidence Predicts Information Seeking in Decision Making

Kobe Desender[1,2,3], Annika Boldt[4,5], and Nick Yeung[6]

[1]Department of Neurophysiology and Pathophysiology, University Medical Center Hamburg-Eppendorf, Germany; [2]Department of Experimental Psychology, Ghent University; [3]Department of Psychology, Vrije Universiteit Brussel; [4]Department of Psychology, University of Cambridge; [5]Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience, University College London; and [6]Department of Experimental Psychology, University of Oxford

Abstract

There is currently little direct evidence regarding the function of subjective confidence in decision making: The tight correlation between objective accuracy and subjective confidence makes it difficult to distinguish each variable's unique contribution. Here, we created conditions in a perceptual decision task that were matched in accuracy but differed in subjective evaluation of accuracy by orthogonally varying the strength versus variability of evidence. Confidence was reduced with variable (vs. weak) evidence, even across conditions matched for difficulty. Building on this dissociation, we constructed a paradigm in which participants ($N = 20$) could choose to seek further information before making their decision. The data provided clear support for the hypothesis that subjective confidence predicts information seeking in decision making: Participants were more likely to sample additional information before giving a response in the condition with low confidence, despite matched accuracy. In a preregistered replication ($N = 50$), these findings were replicated with increased task difficulty levels.

People make finely calibrated evaluations of their own performance. In perceptual decision tasks, for example, subjective confidence correlates closely with objective accuracy (Boldt & Yeung, 2015; Fleming, Weil, Nagy, Dolan, & Rees, 2010), indicating that confidence reflects a direct (albeit imperfect) readout of decision processes (De Martino, Fleming, Garrett, & Dolan, 2013; Maniscalco & Lau, 2012; Pasquali, Timmermans, & Cleeremans, 2010). However, the role of decision confidence in adaptive behavior remains unclear. In the memory literature, confidence is thought to serve as a teaching signal during self-regulated learning (Bjork, Dunlosky, & Kornell, 2013; Butler & Winne, 1995; Metcalfe & Finn, 2008). Recent theoretical accounts indeed stress the importance of decision confidence in making predictions, learning from mistakes, and planning subsequent actions in the absence of feedback (Meyniel, Sigman, & Mainen, 2015; Yeung & Summerfield, 2012). However, there is little direct empirical evidence for this hypothesized role of confidence in adaptive decision making.

Animal studies suggest that low confidence motivates exploration before committing to a decision (Call & Carpenter, 2000) or opting out of difficult decisions with low expected payoff (Foote & Crystal, 2007; Hampton, 2001; Smith et al., 1995). However, this interpretation remains controversial because decision accuracy and confidence are typically highly correlated: When evidence clearly favors one option, performance and confidence will both be high; when evidence is equivocal, accuracy will fall, and confidence will be low. Thus, confidence and performance might be separate—but

Corresponding Author:
Kobe Desender, Department of Neurophysiology and Pathophysiology, University Medical Center Hamburg-Eppendorf, Martinistrasse 52, 20251 Hamburg, Germany
E-mail: Kobe.Desender@gmail.com

correlated—expressions of evidence quality (Kiani & Shadlen, 2009). For example, a recent study suggested that confidence in a decision can affect trade-offs between speed and accuracy in a subsequent decision (van den Berg, Zylberberg, et al., 2016a), but the authors inferred confidence from a combination of accuracy, reaction time, and evidence, thus confounding confidence with evidence quality. In studies such as these, it is therefore difficult to determine whether confidence is explicitly represented and causally influences decision making or whether apparent adaptive behaviors are driven by lower-level processes, such as associative learning, to avoid contexts with low evidence quality (Le Pelley, 2012). Crucially, to provide evidence for the former, one needs to demonstrate that confidence predicts strategic decision making while controlling for objective performance (as a proxy for evidence quality).

Importantly, variations in confidence within a single condition are not informative in this respect, because these can still be driven by variations in evidence quality (e.g., due to fluctuations in attention paid across trials; Macdonald, Mathan, & Yeung, 2011). What is needed, therefore, is to induce differences in confidence between conditions that are matched for accuracy. To accomplish this, we built on recent work dissociating accuracy and confidence using perceptual decision tasks that orthogonally manipulated strength and reliability of evidence (de Gardelle & Summerfield, 2011). In these tasks, participants performed categorical judgments on multi-item displays (e.g., judging the average color of eight different-hued items as red or blue). The task is difficult when mean evidence is close to the decision boundary (i.e., average color is purplish rather than clear red or blue) and when evidence is highly variable (i.e., the items consist of various red and blue hues). Crucially, evidence variability influences subjective confidence more strongly than does evidence mean (Boldt, de Gardelle, & Yeung, 2017; Spence, Dux, & Arnold, 2016): Even when performance is matched across conditions with weak versus variable evidence, participants are systematically less confident when variability is high. Here, we leveraged this dissociation to test the hypothesis that strategic information-seeking behavior—specifically, requesting additional evidence before committing to a decision—is predicted by subjective confidence rather than simple evidence quality as reflected in objective accuracy.

Experiment 1

Method

Participants. Twenty participants (7 men; age: $M = 23.7$ years, $SD = 3.1$, range = 20–31) took part in the experiment at the University of Oxford for monetary compensation (£8 plus up to £4.92, dependent on performance; range of the rounded actual payments: £10–£12). Participants were tested individually, and all provided written informed consent. All participants reported normal or corrected-to-normal vision and were naive with respect to the hypothesis. The sample size was chosen because in a previous study this number proved effective in revealing the effect of variance on confidence (Boldt et al., 2017). In that study, the difference in confidence between the two medium-difficulty conditions computed on all trials (see below) produced a large effect size ($n = 20$, Cohen's $d = 1.19$), which gave the current study ($N = 20$) strong power of .99 to detect this. All procedures were approved by the local ethics committee.

Stimuli and apparatus. Stimuli were presented on a gray background on a 20-in. CRT monitor with a 75 Hz refresh rate, using Psychtoolbox3 (Brainard, 1997) for MATLAB (The MathWorks, Natick, MA). Each stimulus comprised eight colored shapes spaced regularly around a fixation point (radius 2.8° visual arc). The mean color of the eight shapes was determined by the variable C; the variance of C across the eight shapes was determined by the variable V. Mean color varied between red (1, 0, 0) and blue (0, 0, 1) by following a linear transition in RGB space (C, 0, 1 − C). At the start of the experiment, C could take four different values: 0.450, 0.474, 0.526, and 0.550 (from blue to red, with 0.5 being the category boundary), and V could take two different values: 0.0333 and 0.1000 (low and high variability, respectively). On each trial, the color of each individual element was pseudorandomly selected, with the constraint that the mean and variability of the eight elements closely matched the values of C and V. Each combination of the C and V values occurred equally often. Four conditions were thus created with different levels of difficulty (see Fig. 1b): an easy condition (*high mean–low variance*), two medium conditions (*low mean–low variance* and *high mean–high variance*), and a hard condition (*low mean–high variance*). The individual elements did not vary in shape. All responses were made using a USB mouse.

Procedure. Figure 1a shows an example experimental trial during the main part of the experiment. The stimulus was flashed for 200 ms, followed by a fixation point for 200 ms. A choice phase followed, consisting of two equally frequent conditions: free choice or forced choice. On free-choice trials, the letters "R" and "S" (or "S" and "R"; counterbalanced across participants) appeared flanking the fixation point. Participants could choose either to request additional evidence by seeing the stimulus again in an easier version ("S") or to give their response ("R"). They indicated their choice by clicking the corresponding mouse button. On forced-choice trials, only an "R" appeared, and participants were forced to select the option to give their response.

a

b

Fig. 1. Example of an experimental trial and the four conditions from Experiment 1. After being presented with the stimulus on half of the trials (a), participants chose either to see the stimulus again in an easier version (by clicking "S") or to give their response (by clicking "R"). These constituted the free-choice trials. On the other half of the trials, participants could choose only to give their response (i.e., forced-choice trials). Then, participants jointly indicated their response and level of confidence on a vertical continuous response scale. The four conditions (b) were created by crossing mean and variance, in order of increasing difficulty. Note that only four out of eight possible trial types are shown because each condition equally often appeared with red and blue as the correct answer.

When participants chose to see the stimulus again, the values of the stimulus were slightly altered so that the mean was higher ($C' = C \pm .01$) and the variability lower ($V' = V - .0167$). They were then presented with a fixation point for 400 ms, the easier stimulus for 200 ms, and a fixation point for 400 ms. When participants opted (or were forced) to give their response without seeing the stimulus again, they simply viewed the fixation point for the same total amount of time (1,000 ms). Afterward, a vertical response scale appeared (9.0° high and 0.4° wide) with a slider (0.1° high and 0.4° wide) in the center. The top of the bar was labeled as "sure blue," the bottom as "sure red" (counterbalanced across participants). Participants moved the cursor with their mouse to jointly indicate their response and their confidence level, and they confirmed by pressing the space bar. The location of the slider on the scale was translated into a numerical score, ranging from −50 ("sure blue") to 50 ("sure red"), with every three screen-pixel (0.09°) increment resulting in a difference of 1 confidence point. No response could be given when the cursor was exactly in the middle (0 on the scale), so participants were forced to make the categorical judgment between red or blue. They were instructed to

make this judgment at their own pace, and accuracy was stressed.

Accuracy for each trial was scored as a binary variable. Confidence was scored as the absolute value on the response scale. To account for between-participants variation in use of the confidence scale and drift in confidence judgments over the course of the experiment, we z-scored ratings separately for each participant and each block.

Participants gained 5 points for correct answers and lost 5 points for errors. They could win up to an additional £4.92 by scoring points (650 points = £1). Crucially, choosing to see the stimulus again in an easier version cost 1 point, giving participants an incentive to ask for the hint only when the benefit of doing so (in terms of increasing the probability of making a correct choice) would outweigh this cost. Participants were explicitly instructed that they could score more points by strategically using the see-again option. Participants were not rewarded for the accuracy of their confidence ratings.

The total experiment comprised 16 blocks. The main part of the experiment (Blocks 8–16) consisted of nine blocks of 64 trials each, with balanced numbers of trials for each combination of mean, variance, and trial type

(free choice vs. forced choice) in pseudorandomized order. Each block started with 8 additional practice trials in which the choice phase was omitted and participants received auditory feedback on the accuracy of their responses. This was done to maintain a stable color criterion over the course of the experiment. Before the main part of the experiment, several practice blocks were administered. In the first block (64 trials), participants practiced the color judgment task with no choice phase and a binary judgment (i.e., the slider could take only three positions, namely centered, up or down, both 2.3°), with auditory feedback to signal decision accuracy. In Blocks 2 to 6 (64 trials each), participants jointly indicated their response and their level of confidence using the continuous response scale. No feedback was delivered during these blocks, which familiarized participants with the confidence-rating scale and allowed staircase-based matching of the difficulty of the two medium-difficulty conditions, as described below. Finally, Practice Block 7 was identical to the main part of the experiment.

To match performance between the two medium conditions (i.e., high mean–high variance and low mean–low variance), we adaptively changed C levels in the low-mean condition. At the end of Blocks 2 to 6, C was adjusted whenever the two medium conditions (16 trials per condition) were not matched in accuracy. In Blocks 8 to 16, the change in C was based on the accuracies of the preceding two blocks of the forced-choice trials only (16 trials per condition). The magnitude of the change depended on the size of the difference. If there was a difference in error rate of at least 6%, 10%, or 15%, C values of the low-mean condition were adjusted by 0.0005, 0.0012, or 0.0025, respectively. Inspection of the data revealed that, overall, the C values in the low-mean condition at the end of the adaptive staircase procedure ($M = 0.526$ for red stimuli; range = 0.518–0.534) did not differ from the value that was chosen at the start of the experiment (0.526), $|t| < 1$, Bayes factor (BF) = 0.24.[1]

Results

Decision accuracy. Decision accuracy was computed on the basis of the data from the forced-choice trials (ignoring the level of subjective confidence) and submitted to a 2 (mean: low or high) × 2 (variance: low or high) repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA). The 95% confidence intervals (CIs) were computed after logit-transforming the data and then transformed back. Replicating earlier reports (Boldt et al., 2017; de Gardelle & Summerfield, 2011), our results showed that both mean, $F(1, 19) = 125.06$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .87$, BF = 7.65e+09, and variance, $F(1, 19) = 77.15$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .80$, BF = 3.03e+10, affected accuracy, and there was a reliable

interaction between the two factors, $F(1, 19) = 37.73$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .66$, BF = 674. Accuracy was highest in the easy condition, $M = 97.7\%$, 95% CI = [98.7, 99.8], and lowest in the hard condition, $M = 75.2\%$, 95% CI = [71.0, 82.1]. Crucially, follow-up contrasts focusing on the two medium-difficulty conditions revealed that accuracy was effectively matched across the low-mean–low-variance and high-mean–high-variance conditions, $M = 91.6\%$, 95% CI = [90.3, 95.3] versus $M = 91.1\%$, 95% CI = [90.0, 95.7], respectively, $|t| < 1$, BF = 0.26. Thus, our staircase procedure was successful in creating two conditions that were matched in terms of objective accuracy (Fig. 2a). See Table 1 for a summary of all the dependent variables in this experiment, split over the different conditions. Given that the task was unspeeded, we did not observe any reliable differences in reaction time, all Fs < 1, all BFs < 0.33.

Confidence judgments. Next, the data from forced-choice trials were used to examine how subjective confidence related to accuracy, how mean and variance influenced subjective confidence, and whether subjective confidence was, as predicted, reduced in the high-mean–high-variance condition compared with the low-mean–low-variance condition, despite their matched performance.

Confidence resolution. Participants tended to be more accurate when they expressed higher levels of confidence. Logistic regression models were fitted for each participant to separately predict accuracy on the basis of confidence levels, and positive significant slopes were observed for all fits, all ps < .017. To examine whether these results held when controlling for difficulty, we additionally entered the factors evidence mean (high or low) and variance (high or low) into the regression. Again, positive slopes for confidence were observed for all fits, and these fits were significantly different from 0 for 18 out of 20 participants. Correspondingly, after dividing trials into quintile bins according to confidence (for each participant separately), we observed a monotonic increase in accuracy with level of confidence (Fig. 2b).

Average confidence. The effect of mean and variance on z-scored confidence ratings was assessed on the data from the forced-choice trials using a 2 (mean: low or high) × 2 (variance: low or high) repeated measures ANOVA. Here, we report the results of confidence on all trials. The results for correct trials only, which did not differ materially from those reported here, can be found in the Supplemental Materials available online. Both evidence mean, $F(1, 19) = 152.60$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .89$, BF = 8.44e+08, and variance, $F(1, 19) = 53.64$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .74$, BF = 1.25e+17, influenced confidence ratings. There was also a significant interaction between these factors, but the BF indicated weak ability to reject the null, $F(1,$

a

b

c

d

Fig. 2. Results from Experiment 1. First-order task performance in forced-choice trials (a), irrespective of the level of confidence, is shown as a function of evidence variance and mean. The staircase procedure was successful in matching objective accuracy in the high-mean–high-variance and the low-mean–low-variance conditions. The distribution of objective accuracy in forced-choice trials (b) is shown as a function of confidence, separately for correct and incorrect trials. The mean of standardized confidence in forced-choice trials (c) is shown as a function of evidence variance and mean. The percentage of free-choice trials on which participants chose to give their response rather than to see the stimulus again (d) is shown as a function of evidence variance and mean. Error bars indicate standard errors of the mean.

19) = 9.89, p = .005, η_p^2 = .34, BF = 0.75. Confidence was highest in the easy condition, M = .52, 95% CI = [.39, .65], and lowest in the hard condition, M = −.63, 95% CI = [−.77, −.50]. Crucially, as predicted, and replicating findings from Boldt et al. (2017), our results showed that confidence ratings were significantly lower in the high-mean–high-variance condition, M = −.27, 95% CI = [−.37, −.17], than in the low-mean–low-variance condition, M = −.02, 95% CI = [−.11, .08], $t(19)$ = 3.22, p = .004,

BF = 10 (Fig. 2c). Despite matching for difficulty, individual differences in confidence between the two conditions did not reliably correlate with individual differences in accuracy between them, $r(18)$ = .20, p = .400, BF = 0.24.

Information seeking. On free-choice trials, participants on average chose to the see the stimulus again in an easier version on 37.9% of the trials. There was considerable variability between participants in this percentage (range =

Table 1. Results for the Dependent Variables Across the Four Conditions in Each Experiment

Variable and trial type	High mean–low variance	Low mean–low variance	High mean–high variance	Low mean–low variance
Experiment 1				
Accuracy (%)				
Forced choice	97.69 (5.3)	91.56 (5.2)	91.12 (6.2)	75.19 (9.3)
Free choice	98.5 (4.4)	93.6 (7.5)	95.5 (5.0)	82.1 (10.7)
Confidence (*z*-score)				
Forced choice (all trials)	0.52 (0.28)	−0.02 (0.21)	−0.27 (0.22)	−0.64 (0.29)
Forced choice (correct trials only)	0.53 (0.27)	0.07 (0.21)	−0.21 (0.22)	−0.56 (0.27)
Free choice (all trials)	0.65 (0.30)	0.23 (0.25)	0.03 (0.22)	−0.38 (0.28)
Free choice (correct trials only)	0.67 (0.27)	0.28 (0.24)	0.05 (0.21)	−0.26 (0.29)
See again (%)				
Free choice (all trials)	14.0 (17.8)	32.1 (26.4)	45.8 (29.3)	59.9 (27.6)
Free choice (correct trials only)	14.0 (22.2)	32.4 (33.9)	45.9 (34.3)	59.9 (35.9)
Experiment 2				
Accuracy (%)				
Forced choice	87.0 (9.2)	72.9 (7.6)	73.0 (8.4)	62.2 (7.6)
Free choice	90.3 (6.7)	79.8 (11.3)	79.8 (10.8)	68.9 (10.9)
Confidence (*z*-score)				
Forced choice (all trials)	0.04 (0.30)	−0.11 (0.32)	−0.17 (0.27)	−0.21 (0.29)
Forced choice (correct trials only)	0.08 (0.30)	−0.07 (0.32)	−0.09 (0.27)	−0.16 (0.32)
Free choice (all trials)	0.17 (0.35)	0.06 (0.33)	−0.04 (0.26)	−0.11 (0.25)
Free choice (correct trials only)	0.20 (0.35)	0.09 (0.33)	−0.00 (0.26)	−0.06 (0.27)
See again (%)				
Free choice (all trials)	32.5 (24.0)	38.9 (24.7)	45.4 (26.7)	47.3 (27.1)
Free choice (correct trials only)	33.0 (24.7)	40.8 (24.9)	47.7 (25.5)	50.1 (27.8)

Note: Values in parentheses are standard deviations.

9%–80%), but this did not correlate reliably with individual differences in overall mean confidence on forced-choice trials, $r(18) = -.26$, $p = .268$, BF = 0.31, or accuracy on forced-choice trials, $r(18) = .24$, $p = .299$, BF = 0.29.

To examine how evidence mean and variance influenced strategic information-seeking behavior, we calculated the percentage of see-again choices in free-choice trials separately for each trial type and then entered them into a 2 (mean: low or high) × 2 (variance: low or high) repeated measures ANOVA. Mirroring the results of the confidence judgments, effects of both mean, $F(1, 19) = 71.46$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .79$, BF = 2.25e+05, and variance, $F(1, 19) = 82.23$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .81$, BF = 4.78e+13, were significant, but there was no interaction, $F < 1$, $\eta_p^2 = .04$, BF = 0.39. As expected, in the hard condition, participants asked to see the stimulus again on the majority of these trials, $M = 59.9\%$, 95% CI = [47.0, 72.8], whereas in the easy condition, this occurred rarely, $M = 14.0\%$, 95% CI = [5.7, 22.3]. Crucially, and as predicted, participants more often chose to see the stimulus again in the high-mean–high-variance condition, $M = 45.8\%$, 95% CI = [32.1, 59.5], that was associated with lower confidence ratings, compared with the low-mean–low-variance condition, $M = 32.1\%$, 95%

CI = [19.8, 44.5], $t(19) = 6.23$, $p < .001$, BF = 3,749 (see Fig. 2d). This finding proved to be highly robust, with 19 out of 20 participants showing the pattern. Moreover, the 1 participant who requested to see the stimulus again more often in the low-mean–low-variance condition also expressed lower confidence in this condition compared with the high-mean–high-variance condition. Indeed, as can be seen in Figure 3, there was a trend correlation across participants between differences in confidence on forced-choice trials and differences in see-again choices across the two medium-difficulty conditions, $r(18) = .42$, $p = .063$, 95% CI = [−.02, .73], BF = 0.95. However, this relation should be cautiously interpreted given that the BF indicates that these data are uninformative.

Importantly, it should be ruled out that participants more often chose to view the stimulus again in the high-mean–high-variance condition than in the low-mean–low-variance condition simply because it was more helpful to do so for these trials. To this end, we compared these two conditions for see-again trials only. Because of a lack of at least 10 trials in one of these cells, only 13 participants were included in this analysis. Crucially, after participants asked to see the stimulus

Fig. 3. Results from Experiment 1: scatterplot showing the relationship between the difference scores for confidence judgments and see-again choices in the two medium-difficulty conditions. The dotted line indicates the best-fitting regression.

again, accuracy still did not differ reliably between the two medium-difficulty conditions, $t(12) = -1.45$, $p = .17$, BF = 0.65. If anything, accuracy was numerically lower in the high-mean–high-variance condition, $M = 96.2\%$, 95% CI = [93.4, 98.8], than in the low-mean–low-variance condition, $M = 97.5\%$, 95% CI = [95.1, 99.9]. This result remained unchanged when we included the 7 participants who had fewer than 10 trials in one of the

cells, $|t| < 1$, BF = 0.25. These findings argue strongly against the possibility that participants chose to see the stimulus again more often in the high-mean–high-variance condition because it was more useful to do so than in the low-mean–low-variance condition.

Metacognitive ability. We next performed exploratory analyses to investigate whether the impact of evidence variability on confidence judgments and see-again choices relates to individual differences in metacognitive ability. Using the data from forced-choice trials, we computed M ratios (Fleming & Lau, 2014) to quantify the efficiency with which each participant's confidence ratings discriminated between his or her correct and incorrect responses (so-called meta-d') while controlling for first-order performance (d'). When this ratio is 1, all available first-order information is used in the confidence judgment. When the ratio is smaller than 1, metacognitive sensitivity is suboptimal, meaning that not all available information from the first-order response is used in the metacognitive judgment (Fleming & Lau, 2014). Averaged across conditions, mean d' was 2.58 ($SD = 0.65$) and mean meta-d' was 1.76 ($SD = 0.63$), giving a ratio meta-d'/d' of 0.69 ($SD = 0.26$). Interestingly, individual differences in meta-d'/d' ratio were positively correlated with differences in confidence between the two medium-difficulty conditions, $r(18) = .72$, $p < .001$, 95% CI = [.42, .88], BF = 109, as well as with differences in see-again choices between these conditions, $r(18) = .49$, $p = .028$, 95% CI = [.06, .77], BF = 1.88 (Fig. 4). Thus, the influence of evidence variability on subjective confidence and strategic information seeking was more profound in participants with good


Fig. 4. Results from Experiment 1: relationship between metacognitive efficiency, quantified as meta-d'/d', on forced-choice trials and the difference between the two medium-difficulty conditions in both (a) confidence judgments and (b) see-again choices, which were both calculated from free-choice trials. The dotted lines indicate the best-fitting regressions.

metacognitive ability. However, our sample size was not chosen to test this specific question, and these analyses were performed in an exploratory rather than a hypothesis-driven fashion. Therefore, a high-powered replication of these correlations is necessary to evaluate their robustness.

A unique contribution of confidence. The previous results are consistent with the hypothesis that choices to sample more information are driven by subjective confidence, not by performance. To provide further support for this interpretation, we fitted mixed regression models to demonstrate that confidence predicts information seeking over and above measurable factors, and we performed a causal mediation analysis to test whether the influence of evidence variability on see-again choices was mediated by subjective confidence. For both analyses, for each participant, we computed (a) mean confidence on forced-choice trials, (b) the proportion of see-again choices on free-choice trials, and (c) mean accuracy on forced-choice trials, separately for the factors evidence variability (high or low), evidence mean (high or low), and color (red or blue). Values were calculated separately for each color to partition the data in a more fine-grained manner, but this variable was not taken into account in the analyses. For ease of interpretation, low variability and high mean were dummy coded as reference categories so that a positive effect of each factor corresponded to an increase in difficulty.

To demonstrate that confidence had a unique influence on see-again choices over and above the other experimental factors, we fitted a mixed regression model predicting see-again choices by confidence, evidence variability, mean evidence, and mean accuracy (using the lme4 package; Bates, Maechler, Bolker, & Walker, 2015). Random slopes were added for confidence,

variance, and their interaction because this significantly increased the fit compared with a model without random slopes. Degrees of freedom were estimated using Satterthwaite's approximation. As predicted, confidence ($\beta = -0.16$), $t(27.3) = -4.13$, $p < .001$; variance ($\beta = 0.20$), $t(108.2) = 9.02$, $p < .001$; and mean ($\beta = 0.09$), $t(131.4) = 4.97$, $p < .001$, all affected see-again choices, whereas mean accuracy did not, $t(136.2) = 0.41$, $p = .679$. This regression analysis clearly demonstrated that confidence predicted information seeking over and above performance.

Subsequently, we used causal mediation analyses to test whether the effect of variance on see-again choices was mediated by confidence. First, a mediator mixed model was fitted to predict mean confidence by variance (two levels: high or low), mean (two levels: high or low), and mean accuracy, with random slopes for variance. Second, an outcome mixed model was fitted to predict the proportion of see-again choices by mean confidence, variance (two levels: high or low), mean (two levels: high or low), and mean accuracy, with random slopes for mean confidence and variance. A mediation analysis was then performed with these two models (using the mediation package; Tingley, Yamamoto, Hirose, Keele, & Imai, 2014), testing whether the influence of variance on see-again choices was mediated by confidence, conditional on evidence mean and mean accuracy (a more detailed explanation can be found in the Supplemental Material). The results showed that from the total effect of variance on see-again choices ($\beta = 0.2770$, 95% CI = [0.207, 0.350], $p < .001$), there was 44.6% of total variance that was mediated by confidence ($\beta = 0.125$, 95% CI = [0.066, 0.200], $p < .001$; see Fig. 5). This finding suggests that confidence was a crucial mediator between evidence variability and see-again choices,


Fig. 5. Results of the mediation analyses from Experiment 1. Unstandardized regression coefficients are shown from the mediation and the outcome mixed regression models predicting the influence of evidence variability on see-again choices through confidence judgments. Degrees of freedom for calculating significance were based on Satterthwaite's approximation. Asterisks indicate significant paths ($p < .001$). Effect sizes from the causal mediation analysis are shown in (b). Error bars reflect quasi-Bayesian 95% confidence intervals.

although we acknowledge that mediation analysis is a correlational technique and therefore cannot provide ultimate evidence for causality (but see the Supplemental Material for further analysis that supports our interpretation).

Comparing forced-choice and free-choice trials. A final set of analyses focused on possible performance benefits (or costs) of information seeking. As a manipulation check, we first confirmed that the opportunity to see the stimulus again led to improved performance and increased confidence. Simple t tests revealed that participants were on average more accurate (free choice – forced choice: $M = 3.5\%$, 95% CI = [1.9, 5.2]), $t(19) = 4.59$, $p < .001$, BF = 151, and more confident (free choice – forced choice: $M = 0.23$, 95% CI = [0.14, 0.33]), $t(19) = 5.30$, $p < .001$, BF = 616, in the free-choice condition (in which they could choose to see the stimulus again) compared with the forced-choice condition. In relation to these findings, we note that free-choice trials are more demanding than forced-choice trials. Free-choice trials constitute a dual-task situation (two choices must be made), whereas in forced-choice trials, only one decision must be made. Although a dual task would typically reduce performance, and thus cannot account for the increase in performance and confidence in the free-choice condition, it remains possible that confidence and accuracy might be affected in other ways by this difference in demand.

Focusing on the medium-difficulty conditions, we found that the data further showed that the increase in accuracy in free-choice trials relative to forced-choice trials was larger for the high-mean–high-variance condition (free choice – forced choice: $M = 4.4\%$, 95% CI = [2.2, 6.6]), than for the low-mean–low-variance condition (free choice – forced choice: $M = 2.1\%$, 95% CI = [−0.2, 4.3]), $F(1, 19) = 5.07$, $p = .036$, BF = 1.78, although the BF indicated weak evidence. This observation reflects that participants more often requested to see the stimulus again in the high-mean–high-variance condition, and as reported above, seeing the stimulus again increased performance. If this conjecture was true, the performance difference between trials in which participants waived the see-again option and forced-choice trials (which are identical in terms of visual input) should have been larger for the high-mean–high-variance condition than for the low-mean–low-variance condition. This is because participants were less confident in the high-mean–high-variance condition, so they needed to be more accurate on average before turning down the option of seeing the stimulus again. First, we confirmed that overall performance was indeed better on trials where participants waived the option of seeing the stimulus again ($M = 94.0\%$, 95%

CI = [91.2, 96.9]), compared with forced-decision trials ($M = 88.9\%$, 95% CI = [86.4, 91.4]), $t(19) = 5.07$, $p < .001$, BF = 394 (for a similar finding in monkeys, see Hampton, 2001). Importantly, as predicted, this difference was larger for the high-mean–high-variance condition (choose to respond – forced decision: $M = 4.3\%$, 95% CI = [1.6, 7.0]), than for the low-mean–low-variance condition (choose to respond – forced decision: $M = 1.6\%$, 95% CI = [−0.8, 4.0]), $F(1, 19) = 6.22$, $p = .022$, $\eta_p^2 = .25$, BF = 2.67.

The above analyses suggest that participants indeed strategically used the option to receive additional evidence to increase their performance. Additional evidence increased performance more in the high-mean–high-variance condition than in the low-mean–low-variance condition, because in the former condition, participants were less confident and thus more willing to ask for additional evidence. This pattern was not observed for confidence judgments: The increase in confidence on free-choice trials over forced-choice trials was not different between the two medium-difficulty conditions, $F < 1$. Likewise, participants were more confident when they turned down additional evidence in the free-choice condition ($M = .29$, 95% CI = [.16, .42]), compared with being forced to respond ($M = −.10$, 95% CI = [−.14, −.06]), $t(19) = 5.21$, $p < .001$, BF = 524. However, this increase did not differ reliably between the two medium-difficulty conditions, $F(1, 19) = 1.22$, $p = .283$, $\eta_p^2 = .06$, BF = 0.39. In sum, these additional analyses demonstrate that participants indeed strategically used the see-again option to increase their performance.

Experiment 2: Preregistered Replication

In Experiment 2, we aimed to replicate the results of Experiment 1, with an increased sample size and with increased task difficulty to address possible concerns about ceiling effects in accuracy (accuracy on see-again choices in the critical medium-difficulty conditions exceeded 96% in Experiment 1). The experimental protocols and all analyses were preregistered on the Open Science Framework. The replication specifically enabled us to evaluate the robustness of individual-difference correlations observed in Experiment 1, now using a sample size appropriately powered for these analyses.

Method

Participants. Following Simonsohn (2015), we increased our sample size by a factor of 2.5 (equaling $N = 50$). This ensured 80% power to reject the null hypothesis that effects observed in Experiment 1 were too small to detect with that sample. This new sample size provided strong

power (.96) to detect the correlation reported in Figure 4b. After replacing the data from 1 participant who stopped halfway through the experiment, 50 participants from the Free University of Brussels (17 men; age: M = 20.1 years, SD = 2.7, range = 18–29; 7 left-handed) took part in return for course credit and additional monetary compensation depending on performance (range = €1–€3.7). Participants were tested in groups of 5 people at most, seated in individual cubicles. They provided written informed consent. All participants reported normal or corrected-to-normal vision and were naive with respect to the hypothesis. All procedures were approved by the local ethics committee.

Stimuli, apparatus, and procedure. The stimuli, apparatus, and procedure were identical to those in Experiment 1, except that new mean color (C) values were chosen at the start of the experiment to increase task difficulty. Specifically, values were chosen so that the two medium-difficulty conditions were slightly more difficult than the hard condition of Experiment 1, aiming for an accuracy level in these conditions of 70% to 75%. Thus, C could now take four different values: 0.470, 0.485, 0.515, and 0.530 (from blue to red, with 0.5 being the category boundary).

Results

Decision accuracy. Decision accuracy was computed using the data from forced-choice trials (ignoring the level of subjective confidence) and submitted to a 2 (mean: low or high) × 2 (variance: low or high) repeated measures ANOVA. Both mean, $F(1, 49)$ = 432.52, $p <$ .001, η_p^2 = .90, BF = 6.96e+33, and variance, $F(1, 49)$ = 214.92, $p < .001$, η_p^2 = .81, BF = 2.34e+33, affected accuracy. Although there was a significant interaction between the two factors, $F(1, 49)$ = 5.68, p = .021, η_p^2 = .10, BF = 1.58, the BF indicated that the data were uninformative on this point. Accuracy was highest in the easy condition, M = 87.0%, 95% CI = [87.0, 91.7], and lowest in the hard condition, M = 62.2%, 95% CI = [60.2, 64.7]. Note that the interaction between mean and variance was much weaker than the interaction reported in Experiment 1 (where η_p^2 = .66) and was over- rather than underadditive. In Figure 2a, a clear ceiling effect can be seen in the high-mean–low-variance condition of Experiment 1, which might be the cause of this interaction. Figure 6a demonstrates that this ceiling effect was effectively dealt with in Experiment 2 by increasing the difficulty of the task. Crucially, follow-up contrasts focusing on the two medium-difficulty conditions revealed that accuracy was effectively matched across the low-mean–low-variance and the high-mean–high-variance conditions, M = 72.9%, 95% CI = [71.3, 75.8] versus M = 73.0%, 95% CI = [71.4, 76.3], respectively, $|t| < 1$, BF = 0.15. On average, C values in the low-mean condition at the end of the experiment (M =

0.515 for red stimuli, range = 0.502–0.528) did not differ from the value that was chosen at the start of the experiment (M = 0.515), $|t| < 1$, BF = 0.16. Given that the task was unspeeded, we did not observe any reliable differences in reaction time, all ps > .157, all BFs < 0.55.

Confidence judgments.

Confidence resolution. Logistic regression models predicting accuracy on the basis of the level of confidence were fitted separately for each participant. Positive slopes were observed for 47 out of 50 fits; however, these were significant for only 29 participants ($p < .05$), whereas they did not reach significance ($p > .05$) for the other 21 participants. When the factors mean (high or low) and variance (high or low) were additionally entered into the regression, positive slopes for confidence were observed for 47 out of 50 participants. For 17 participants, these were significant ($p < .05$) in the expected direction. On the group level, after dividing trials into quintile bins according to confidence (for each participant separately), we observed a monotonic increase in accuracy with the level of confidence (Fig. 6b).

Average confidence. The effects of mean and variance on z-scored confidence ratings were assessed on the data of the forced-choice trials using a 2 (mean: low or high) × 2 (variance: low or high) repeated measures ANOVA. Here, we report the results of confidence on all trials; the results for correct trials only, which did not differ materially from those reported here, can be found in the Supplemental Material. Both mean, $F(1, 49)$ = 31.17, $p <$ .001, η_p^2 = .39, BF = 322, and variance, $F(1, 49)$ = 22.67, $p < .001$, η_p^2 = .32, BF = 3.23e+07, influenced confidence ratings. There was also a significant interaction between these factors, $F(1, 49)$ = 14.28, $p < .001$, η_p^2 = .22, BF = 1.82, although the evidence was weak. Confidence was highest in the easy condition, M = .04, 95% CI = [−.04, .12], and lowest in the hard condition, M = −.21, 95% CI = [−.29, −.13]. As predicted, confidence ratings were numerically lower in the high-mean–high-variance condition, M = −.17, 95% CI = [−.25, −.09], than in the low-mean–low-variance condition, M = −.11, 95% CI = [−.20, −.01], but the effect was marginally significant only in a two-tailed contrast, $t(49)$ = 1.79, p = .079, BF = 0.67 (Fig. 6c), perhaps because of the greater between-subjects variability in confidence judgments in this experiment with an overall more difficult version of the task (see the Supplemental Material). When we analyzed median confidence, as suggested by a reviewer, the difference in confidence between the two medium-difficulty conditions was clearer, $t(49)$ = 2.44, p = .018, BF = 2.27. Finally, individual differences in confidence between the two conditions did not reliably correlate with individual differences in accuracy between them, $r(48)$ = .15, p = .296, BF = 0.19.

Fig. 6. Results from Experiment 2. First-order task performance in forced-choice trials (a), irrespective of the level of confidence, is shown as a function of evidence variance and mean. The staircase procedure was successful in matching objective accuracy in the high-mean–high-variance and the low-mean–low-variance conditions. The distribution of objective accuracy in forced-choice trials (b) is shown as a function of confidence, separately for correct and incorrect trials. The mean of standardized confidence in forced-choice trials (c) is shown as a function of evidence variance and mean. The percentage of free-choice trials on which participants chose to give their response rather than to see the stimulus again (d) is shown as a function of evidence variance and mean. Error bars indicate standard errors of the mean.

Information seeking. On free-choice trials, participants, on average, chose to the see the stimulus again in an easier version on 41.0% of the trials. This rate is similar to that observed in Experiment 1 (37.9%), and once again, there was considerable variability between participants in this percentage (range = 1.5%–96.5%), which did not correlate reliably with individual differences in overall mean confidence on forced-choice trials, $r(48) = -.12$, $p = .388$, BF = 0.16, or accuracy on forced-choice trials, $r(48) = -.03$, $p = .816$, BF = 0.11.

To examine how evidence mean and variance influenced strategic information-seeking behavior, we calculated the percentage of see-again choices in free-choice trials separately for each trial type and then entered them into a 2 (mean: low or high) × 2 (variance: low or high) repeated measures ANOVA. Effects of both mean, $F(1, 49) = 28.830$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .37$, BF = 95, and variance, $F(1, 49) = 46.65$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .49$, BF = 2.40e+14, were significant, as well as the interaction between the two factors, $F(1, 49) = 9.99$, $p = .003$, $\eta_p^2 = .17$, BF = 1.47,

Fig. 7. Results from Experiment 2: scatterplot showing the relationship between the difference scores for confidence judgments and see-again choices in the two medium-difficulty conditions. The dotted line indicates the best-fitting regression.

although the evidence for the latter was weak. As expected, in the hard condition, participants asked to see the stimulus again most frequently, $M = 47.3\%$, 95% CI = [39.6, 55.0], whereas in the easy condition, this occurred less often, $M = 32.5\%$, 95% CI = [25.7, 39.4]. This difference was consistently observed, though numerically it was much smaller than in Experiment 1, where the task was easier overall and where see-again choices were less evenly distributed across conditions.

Crucially, replicating Experiment 1, participants more often chose to see the stimulus again in the high-mean–high-variance condition, $M = 45.4\%$, 95% CI = [37.8, 52.9], compared with the low-mean–low-variance condition, $M = 38.9\%$, 95% CI = [31.9, 46.0], $t(49) = 4.47$, $p < .001$, BF = 468 (see Fig. 6d). Moreover, there was a reliable correlation across participants between differences in confidence and differences in see-again choices across the two medium-difficulty conditions, $r(48) = .36$, $t(48) = 2.65$, $p = .011$, 95% CI = [.08, .58], BF = 2.78 (Fig. 7). Interestingly, although not designed with this contrast in mind, the data of Experiment 2 provide further support for a coupling between confidence and information seeking in relation to the contrast between the two high-variance conditions. In particular, whereas the high-mean–high-variance and the low-mean–high-variance conditions showed marked and highly consistent differences in accuracy, $t(49) = 11.60$, $p < .001$, BF > 5.64e+12 (Fig. 6a), there was only inconclusive evidence for a difference in see-again choices between the two conditions, $t(49) = 1.868$, $p =$

.067, BF = 0.76 (Fig. 6d). Consistent with our proposed coupling between confidence and information sampling, confidence also differed only modestly between these conditions, $t(49) = 2.58$, $p = .013$, BF = 3.04 (Fig. 6c).

To rule out the possibility that participants more often choose to view the stimulus again in the high-mean–high-variance condition than in the low-mean–low-variance condition simply because it was more helpful to do so for these trials, we compared these two conditions for see-again trials only. Because of a lack of at least 10 trials in one of these cells, only 42 participants were included in this analysis. Crucially, after participants asked to see the stimulus again, accuracy still did not differ reliably between the two medium-difficulty conditions, $|t| < 1$, BF = 0.25; high-mean–high-variance condition: $M = 86.0\%$, 95% CI = [82.4, 89.6]; low-mean–low-variance condition, $M = 84.1\%$, 95% CI = [79.9, 88.4].

Metacognitive ability. We next investigated whether the impact of evidence variability on confidence judgments and see-again choices related to individual differences in metacognitive ability. Averaged across conditions, the mean d' was 1.30, 95% CI = [1.17, 1.43], and the mean meta-d' was 0.50, 95% CI = [0.39, 0.62], resulting in a ratio meta-d'/d' of 0.41, 95% CI = [0.32, 0.49]. Contrary to the results of exploratory analyses in Experiment 1, individual differences in meta-d'/d' ratio did not correlate reliably with differences in confidence between the two medium-difficulty conditions, $r(48) = .08$, $p = .585$, 95% CI = [−.20, .35], BF = 0.13, or with differences in see-again choices between these conditions, $r(48) = .14$, $p = .323$, 95% CI = [−.14, .40], BF = 0.18 (Fig. 8). This lack of correlation did not result from the reduced correspondence between confidence and accuracy compared with Experiment 1 (see the Confidence Resolution section): Both correlations were far from significant in the subset of 29 participants for whom confidence significantly predicted accuracy—difference scores for confidence: $r(27) = −.16$, $p = .41$, BF = 0.20; difference scores for see-again choices: $r(27) = −.15$, $p = .43$, BF = 0.20.

A unique contribution of confidence. The same mixed regression model as in Experiment 1 was fitted to the data, with random slopes for confidence, variance, and accuracy. Similar to Experiment 1, confidence ($\beta = −0.10$), $t(107.0) = −4.47$, $p < .001$; variance ($\beta = 0.07$), $t(47.5) = 5.24$, $p < .001$; and accuracy ($\beta = 0.12$), $t(53.7) = 3.91$, $p < .001$, all affected see-again choices, whereas evidence mean did so less consistently, $t(297.1) = 1.74$, $p = .084$. This finding demonstrates that confidence predicted see-again choices over and above the other experimental variables.

To perform the same causal mediation analysis as in Experiment 1, we fitted the same two mixed models to

a

b

Fig. 8. Results from Experiment 2: relationship between metacognitive efficiency, quantified as meta-d'/d', on forced-choice trials and the difference between the two medium-difficulty conditions in both (a) confidence judgments and (b) see-again choices, which were both calculated from free-choice trials. The dotted lines indicate the best-fitting regressions.

the data, with random slopes for the factor variance in the mediator model and random slopes for confidence, variance, and accuracy in the outcome model. The results showed that from the total effect of variance on see-again choices ($\beta = 0.084$), 95% CI = [0.055, 0.110], $p < .001$, there was 17.7% of total variance mediated by confidence ($\beta = 0.015$), 95% CI = [0.007, 0.023], $p < .001$, conditional on mean accuracy and evidence mean (see Fig. 9). Thus, similar to Experiment 1, this finding is in line with our hypothesis that confidence mediates between evidence variability and see-again choices.

Comparing forced-choice and free-choice trials. As a manipulation check, we again confirmed that the opportunity to see the stimulus led to improved performance and increased confidence. Simple t tests revealed that participants were on average more accurate (free choice − forced choice: $M = 5.92\%$, 95% CI = [4.58, 7.26]), $t(49) = 8.90$, $p < .001$, BF = 1.09e+09, and more confident (free choice − forced choice: $M = 0.13$, 95% CI = [0.08, 0.17]), $t(49) = 6.02$, $p < .001$, BF = 67,299, in the free-choice condition (in which they could choose to see the stimulus again) compared with the forced-choice condition. Contrary to Experiment 1, however, the increase in accuracy in free-choice trials relative to forced-choice trials was not different between the high-mean–high-variance (free choice − forced choice: $M = 6.73\%$, 95% CI = [4.57, 8.89]), and the low-mean–low-variance (free choice − forced choice: $M = 6.74\%$, 95% CI = [4.23, 9.25]), conditions, $|t| < 1$, BF = 0.15. This observation is noteworthy, because even though participants more often requested

to see the stimulus again in the high-mean–high-variance condition, and seeing the stimulus again improved performance, this did not improve accuracy more than it did so in the low-mean–low-variance condition. Also the increase in confidence in free-choice relative to forced-choice trials was not different between the two medium-difficulty conditions, $t(49) = −1.34$, $p = .18$, BF = 0.36.

We further found that performance was better on trials in which participants waived the option of seeing the stimulus again, $M = 77.7\%$, 95% CI = [74.8, 80.7], compared with forced-decision trials, $M = 73.8\%$, 95% CI = [71.8, 75.8], $t(49) = 4.57$, $p < .001$, BF = 629. However, again unlike the results of Experiment 1, this was not different between the two medium-difficulty conditions, $F < 1$, $\eta_p^2 < .01$, BF = 0.15—high-mean–high-variance condition (choose to respond − forced decision: $M = 4.4\%$, 95% CI = [1.3, 7.4]), $t(49) = 2.91$, $p = .005$, BF = 6.38; low-mean–low-variance condition (see again − forced decision: $M = 4.1\%$, 95% CI = [1.4, 6.8]), $t(49) = 3.02$, $p = .004$, BF = 8.27—perhaps reflecting the more even distribution of see-again choices across conditions in this experiment with a more difficult task overall. The same pattern was observed for confidence judgments. Participants were more confident when they waived additional evidence in the free-choice condition, $M = .03$, 95% CI = [−.06, .12], compared with being forced to respond, $M = −.11$, 95% CI = [−.18, −.04], $t(49) = 4.14$, $p < .001$, BF = 173, but this increase did not differ reliably between the two medium-difficulty conditions, $F(1, 49) = 1.80$, $p = .185$, $\eta_p^2 = .03$, BF = 0.17.

Fig. 9. Results of the mediation analyses from Experiment 2. Unstandardized regression coefficients are shown from the mediation and the outcome mixed regression models predicting the influence of evidence variability on see-again choices through confidence judgments. Degrees of freedom for calculating significance were based on Satterthwaite's approximation. Asterisks indicate significant paths (**$p < .01$, ***$p < .001$). Effect sizes from the causal mediation analysis are shown in (b). Error bars reflect quasi-Bayesian 95% confidence intervals.

Discussion

This study provides novel evidence that subjective confidence influences strategic decision making, such that people seek further information when they lack confidence in an initial choice. Our critical manipulation was to contrast conditions matched for objective accuracy but differing in confidence, thus breaking the confound between confidence and objective evidence quality that complicates most existing paradigms. Crucially, participants solicited additional information before committing to a decision more often in a condition with high evidence variance (associated with lower confidence) than in a condition with low mean (associated with higher confidence), despite matched objective accuracy.

Models of decision making and confidence

The dominant characterization of decision making is in terms of continuous accumulation of evidence (Gold & Shadlen, 2007; Ratcliff & McKoon, 2008). Notably, in this framework, deciding whether to sample more information from the environment before committing to a decision depends primarily on whether the level of accumulated evidence has reached a predefined threshold. It has been argued that confidence can also be understood as reflecting the accumulated evidence for a decision (Kiani & Shadlen, 2009; Pleskac & Busemeyer, 2010), with dissociations between confidence and accuracy thought to arise because confidence judgments are typically collected only after a decision has been made (van den Berg, Anandalingam, et al., 2016), allowing time for further evidence accumulation after the initial choice (Moran, Teodorescu, & Usher, 2015; Resulaj,

Kiani, Wolpert, & Shadlen, 2009). This explanation, however, cannot explain the dissociation between confidence and accuracy reported here, because responses were unspeeded and participants provided their decision and confidence judgments in a single response.

In the present study, two conditions were created that were matched for accuracy but differed in subjective confidence: Confidence was lower in a condition with high evidence variability relative to a condition with low evidence mean. This observation is already difficult to interpret within evidence-accumulation models, which predict a close link between accuracy and confidence (see Yeung & Summerfield, 2012, for a discussion). However, our crucial observation was that the decision to seek more information tracked subjective confidence, not objective accuracy: Participants consistently chose to see the stimulus again more often when evidence variability was high than when evidence mean was low. This effect was observed in two experiments differing markedly in overall task difficulty and with data sets collected in different experimental settings, attesting to the robustness of the effect. The effect varied systematically across individuals according to the sensitivity of their confidence judgments to evidence variability.

Thus, the decision whether or not to sample more information related to subjective evaluations of accuracy rather than objective performance. Thus, our findings indicate a distinction between systems representing the decision variable that underpins choice (e.g., Donner, Siegel, Fries, & Engel, 2009) and systems that compute confidence on the basis of a noisy readout of these decision processes (De Martino et al., 2013). Indeed, our findings are naturally explained by theories assuming that confidence depends on computations that are at

least partly distinct from those guiding the initial choice, with potential input from other sources of information (Pasquali et al., 2010). Our results indicate a role for these metacognitive computations in adaptive behavior (Meyniel et al., 2015), in line with findings that choices made with low confidence are less likely to be repeated (Folke, Jacobsen, Fleming, & De Martino, 2016) and have less influence on decisions about whether or not to switch environments (Purcell & Kiani, 2016).

The present study exploited a previously observed effect of evidence variability to dissociate objective accuracy from subjective confidence without specifically aiming to understand the cause of this dissociation. Nonetheless, in replicating previous findings using the same paradigm (Boldt et al., 2017) and related manipulations (Spence et al., 2016), our results stand in apparent contrast to recent findings that evidence mean more strongly influences choice and confidence than evidence weight (Kvam & Pleskac, 2016). In that study, however, evidence weight was operationalized as the amount of evidence, as distinct from the variability of presented evidence studied here. Given this difference, it is difficult to compare Kvam and Pleskac's (2016) findings to ours. Future work could usefully attempt to unravel the interplay between evidence mean, weight, and variability in shaping decisions, confidence, and information seeking.

The importance of replication

In Experiment 1, we observed a correlation between individual differences in metacognitive ability and our key effects. However, the sample size was not chosen to examine correlations, and caution is warranted in drawing conclusions from such exploratory analyses (Lindsay, 2015). Moreover, whereas Experiment 1 had high power to detect confidence differences between the two medium-difficulty conditions (.99), it had much lower power to detect the observed correlations (e.g., power of .62 for the correlation in Fig. 4b). In light of concerns that exploratory studies with low experimental power are prone to false-positive findings, it is notable that the correlations observed in Experiment 1 were not replicated in our high-powered preregistered replication, despite its increased statistical power. It is therefore unlikely that the significant correlations reported in Experiment 1 are meaningful (Simonsohn, 2015). Overall, these findings highlight how good research practice can help to shed better light on the robustness of effects, using high-powered preregistered replications to rigorously examine key findings (here, the influence of confidence on decision making) and examine the validity of effects observed in exploratory analyses.

Limitations

We interpret our findings as showing that confidence influences strategic information seeking. However, an alternative interpretation is that confidence and information seeking are only indirectly linked via their relationship with a third, correlated variable. Specifically, as suggested by a reviewer, it could be that high-variance stimuli have two separate effects: reducing confidence and cuing the need to seek further information (cf. Le Pelley, 2012). As described above, our data favor the former interpretation because confidence strongly mediates the relationship between evidence variability and information seeking, and confidence explains differences in information seeking over and above effects of evidence variability.

This mediation effect is far from trivial, given that the values for confidence and see-again choices are based on different parts of the data (forced choice vs. free choice) and that see-again choices are sampled earlier in time than confidence judgments. Nevertheless, we acknowledge that our results cannot conclusively rule out the latter account. However, converging conceptual considerations strongly favor our interpretation. In particular, our account is consistent with the foundational hypothesis that confidence (like other metacognitive representations) supports adaptive behaviors that are flexible and, crucially, generalizable: Any factor that decreases confidence can produce the same adaptive behavior of information seeking. In contrast, the alternative account provides no account of why confidence should be explicitly represented and, crucially, suggests an account of adaptive behavior that is implausibly rigid: It implies that people would need to learn separately to seek information in an indefinitely large number of conditions—not only when evidence variability is high but also when evidence mean is low, stimulus presentation is brief, lighting conditions are poor, attention has waned, and so forth. Thus, for example, this hypothesis cannot explain the finding in our data that subjective confidence likewise mediates the relationship between mean evidence and information seeking (see the Supplemental Material), a finding that falls out naturally from our interpretation.

Although we argue that our interpretation in terms of confidence provides the most parsimonious explanation of our data, we acknowledge that deeper understanding of the mechanisms by which evidence variability affects confidence will be important to further our understanding of this effect, for example, by ruling out that the dissociation between confidence and accuracy emerges from differences in scale-dependent interactions (Wagenmakers, Krypotos, Criss, & Iverson, 2012). Similarly, future work might usefully investigate

how seeing additional evidence affects performance. Although we found that additional evidence was equally informative in both medium-difficulty conditions, this could be examined only when participants actively chose to sample more information. By introducing a condition where participants are forced to sample more evidence on some trials, researchers could examine whether the value of additional evidence depends on the degree of variability. More generally, this might help to shed light on the question whether our proposed link between evidence variability, confidence, and information seeking is adaptive or is a suboptimal bias.

Conclusion

In the current study, subjective confidence was dissociated from decision accuracy. This enabled us to show that the strategic choice to seek information before committing to a decision is determined by the subjective evaluation of accuracy, as reflected in confidence ratings, rather than by objective accuracy.

Action Editor

Timothy J. Pleskac served as action editor for this article.

Author Contributions

K. Desender, A. Boldt, and N. Yeung designed the study. K. Desender performed the testing and data analysis. K. Desender drafted the manuscript, and A. Boldt and N. Yeung provided critical revisions. All authors approved the final version of the manuscript for submission.

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Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared there were no conflicts of interest with respect to the authorship or the publication of this article.

Supplemental Material

Additional supporting information can be found at http:// journals.sagepub.com/doi/suppl/10.1177/09567976177 44771

Open Practices

All data have been made publicly available via the Open Science Framework and can be accessed at https://osf.io/ sh3wy/. The materials have not been made publicly available. The design and analysis plans for Experiment 2 were preregistered at https://osf.io/awjaf/register/5771ca429ad5a1020de2 872e. The design and analysis plans for Experiment 1 were not preregistered. The complete Open Practices Disclosure for this article can be found at http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/ suppl/10.1177/0956797617744771. This article has received badges for Open Data and Preregistration. More information about the Open Practices badges can be found at http://www .psychologicalscience.org/publications/badges.

Note

1. Because the default frequentist approach to statistics does not allow the interpretation of null effects, we additionally calculated a BF in R using the BayesFactor package (Morey, Rouder, & Jamil, 2014) and the BayesMed package for correlations (Nuijten, Wetzels, Matzke, Dolan, & Wagenmakers, 2015), using the default priors. Bayes factors for analyses of variance (ANOVAs) were calculated using a model comparison approach. Compared with classical p values, a BF has the advantage that it can discriminate between data in favor of the null hypothesis (BF < 1/3), data in favor of the alternative hypothesis (BF > 3), and data that is uninformative (BF ≈ 1).

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